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Charles J. Russo 
A major challenge facing educators, whether at the building or district level, is how to 
create and maintain safe, risk-free learning environments for students. Whether students 
are in class, playing in school yards, or participating in extracurricular activities, educa-
tors worry about the risk of liability for injuries that children suffer if they breach their 
duty to protect the youngsters from unreasonable risks of harm. 
The task of insulating educators and their school systems from liability is certainly 
daunting. Yet, awareness of the principles constituting the legal duty to supervise stu-
dents properly and the defenses to the tort of negligence can go a long way toward 
protecting school boards and their personnel. Insofar as negligence can result in potential-
ly costly litigation, school business officials (S80s), their boards, and other educational 
leaders can help to protect themselves and their systems by familiarizing themselves with 
the basic elements of this important topic. 
Negligence is a common law tort, meaning that it is typically rooted in case law and 
depends heavily on the facts of specific situations, often involving fault when the uninten-
tional conduct of individuals breaches their duty of care and causes injuries to others. In 
school settings, boards and their employees have a duty to protect students, visitors, staff, 
and others from reasonably foreseeable risks of harm. 
The duty of educators to supervise students, in particular, aside, neither boards nor 
teachers are insurers of student safety since most injuries in schools arise from accidents 
such as where children were unintentionally injured while playing soccer, 1 dodgeball,2 or 
field hockey3 during physical education class. Even so, educators are not insurers of 
student safety since most injuries in schools derive from what the law calls unavoidable, 
or pure, accidents, meaning those for which no legal fault lies and for which they cannot 
reasonably be expected to supervise and control students continuously.4 
For school boards or their employees to be liable for negligence, injured parties must 
prove that educators failed to meet the elements of negligence: duty and the related 
concept of foreseeability, breach, injury, and causation. Insofar as duty and breach in-
volve the largest part of negligence claims, they receive the lion's share of attention in this 
chapter. Further, for plaintiffs to prevail, education officials must not have been able to 
assert a defense such as immunity, assumption of risk, and or contributory/comparative 
negligence, which can help to reduce, or even eliminate, liability. 
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In reviewing the elements of negligence it is important to realize that, since they are 
not mutually exclusive, any number of the cases discussed herein can be used to demon-
strate multiple points of law. Moreover, since, as noted, the facts are essential in deciding 
whether a party was negligent, the following discussion and use of exemplary cases that 
best represent the issues in dispute, regardless of when they were litigated, help to illus-
trate some of the wide array of issues that arise in school settings. s 
ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE 
Duty 
In the law of negligence, absent the existence of legal relationships, individuals have 
no duty to act. Put another way, no relationship, no duty. It is thus important to recog-
nize, when a sufficient relationship is present, individuals have a duty to act. In this 
regard, educators who act within the scope of their duties, whether in classrooms, at other 
schools in their dish'icts, or as part of cocurricular or extracurricular activities, on campus 
or off, have a duty to assist all students in a group even if they do not know individuals or 
children personally. This duty arises based on educators' legal relationships with their 
school boards and is not limited to children (or others) from the building where they 
work. Given the significance of the element of duty, it is safe to say that most negligence 
cases can be viewed in the broad context of adequacy of supervision. Insofar as adequate 
student supervision should prevent injuries from reasonably foreseeable dangers, all ac-
tivities must be supervised depending on such factors as their nature and the ages of the 
children involved. 
Once the law recognizes the existence of legal relationships, educators have the duty to 
anticipate reasonably foreseeable injuries or risks to students and take reasonable steps to 
try to protect them from harm. In acknowledging foreseeability as a highly flexible con-
cept that varies based on students' ages and physical conditions as well as the degrees of 
d~nger inherent in situations, the law does not expect educators to foresee all harm that 
might befall children. Rather, educators are responsible for only those mishaps that can 
reasonably be anticipated or of which they are actually aware. 
If educators at the building level take reasonable precautions but intervening acts that 
could not have been foreseen occur, then they are unlikely to be liable. For example, 
where teachers in New York could not have anticipated that students were going to pull 
chairs out from peers as they attempted to sit down, courts have refused to impose 
liability. 6 Other courts refused to render boards liable for such unanticipated events as 
when a student in Mississippi slipped and was injured during a classroom skit7 and when 
spontaneous fighting erupted between students in New Yorks unless one child was clear-
ly the aggressor and school officials failed to intervene as happened in another case from 
New York. 9 Still, depending on the circumstances, not all courts agree on whether boards 
should be liable if children are injured while using playground equipment. 10 
While the requisite level of supervision may decrease before the opening of a school 
day and after students are dismissed, once officials know, or should know, that children 
are present, they must act to ensure their safety. For instance, where a principal was 
aware that students were playing football before classes began because he directed them 
to do so in the specific location where a child was injured, the supreme court of Idaho 
held that a trial was necessary to consider whether he breached his duty to supervise the 
children. 11 
On the other hand, where a child called his mother on a cell phone as he left school 
and she waved to him from across the road, an appellate court in New York affirmed that 
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the board was not liable when he was struck by a vehicle as he attempted to cross in the 
middle of a block, under her direction, rather than at a designated, supervised location on 
school grounds. 12 The court pointed out that insofar as the board did not owe a custodial 
duty of care to the student, it could not be liable for his injuries. Earlier, the supreme court 
of Kansas affirmed that a board was not liable for injuries that a child sustained when he 
was struck by a car after being chased off of school grounds by a peer before classes 
started. 13 The court agreed that the board could not be liable absent evidence that officials 
affirmatively assumed a duty to protect or supervise the child before classes began since 
he was not in their custody or control. 
Admittedly older, but still good, cases stand for the proposition that boards are not 
always liable for "flying" objects in and around schools. Accordingly, where a child was 
struck in the eye by a paper clip that a classmate shot from a rubber band, the supreme 
court of New Jersey found that the principal was liable for his injuries. 14 The court noted 
that insofar as the principal was at school but had not set rules for children as they 
gathered before starting classes, had not assigned teachers or others to assist him in 
supervising the children at that time, and was not looking after the students when the 
accident took place, he was liable. 
The supreme court of Wyoming reached the opposite result in deciding that neither a 
school board nor a teacher's aide was liable where a seven-year-old was partially blinded 
by a small rock thrown by a peer that bounced off a larger rock while they were at 
recess. 15 The court observed that, since the teacher's aide who was supervising the play-
ground where the accident occurred walked by the students approximately thirty seconds 
before the accident took place but did not see anything out of the ordinary and the injury 
was not foreseeable, neither she nor the board was responsible. Similarly, an appellate 
court in Ohio affirmed that a board was not liable for a first grader's injuries after he was 
struck in the eye by a dirt ball thrown by a fourth grader since the older child's action was 
not foreseeable. 16 
In a case involving sports in which a sixteen-year-old female high school football 
player suffered serious internal injuries as a result of being tackled cleanly by a play~r 
from the other team, she and her mother sued their school board for negligent supervI-
sion. 17 Even in conceding that the student suffered serious injuries, an appellate court in 
Maryland affirmed that the board did not have a duty to warn the student or her mother 
of the obvious risks posed by her voluntary participation in interscholastic football be-
cause the foreseeable risk of injury was normal and obvious. 
As violence continues in and around schools, parties are increasingly filing suit in 
attempts to render boards and educational officials liable for student deaths and injuries. 
By way of illustration, the tragic shootings at Columbine (Colorado) High School in April 
1999 that left fifteen people dead, includ ing a teacher and the two students who under-
took the rampage, and injured others, gave rise to a series of unsuccessful lawsuits against 
the board and other public officials. 18 
Two other cases illustrate the types of issues that educators face with regard to vio-
lence in and around schools. In Louisiana, the mother of a student who was shot and 
killed in a parking lot after a school-sponsored dance sued the board and the club where 
the event occurred over an alleged lack of security. An appellate court ruled that the 
board had not breached its duty of care since officials lacked the requisite degree of 
foreseeability that would have imposed a duty on them to provide additional security in 
the parking lot. 19 The court also explained that the club owner was not liable for the 
student's death since there was only slight foreseeability and gravity of harm from the 
criminal acts of a third party in the parking lot. In a similar vein, where a student was shot 
by an unknown assailant while leaving a dance at his high school cafeteria, an appellate 
court in New York affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a board in his suit, 
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which sought to recover for his injuries. 20 The court agreed that the student's claim of 
inadequate supervision lacked merit since officials could not reasonably have foreseen 
that the shooting would take place. 
In the first of a pair of tragic cases, when a high school student with a history of 
truancy and drug abuse returned to school following a visit to the doctor but did not 
check back in, she was subsequently murdered in a premeditated act after she left campUs 
without permission. The supreme court of Vermont, in the face of a wrongful death action 
filed by the deceased student's mother, affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor. of 
school officials. 21 The court thought that insofar as educators lacked the requisite notIce 
or knowledge of the student's premeditated murder, it was not within the realm of fore-
seeable actions for which they could be liable. In like fashion, the supreme court of Idaho 
affirmed the dismissal of charges in a case where a high school student was shot and 
killed by two of her male peers. 22 The court agreed that insofar as the risk of harm that the 
males presented to the deceased female was not foreseeable, the board did not have a 
duty to protect her from the shooting, which took place at night and off school grounds. 
Breach 
There are two important elements that must be taken into account when considering 
whether educators breached their duty of care. The first relates to the fact that educators 
can breach their duties in one of two ways. First, they can breach their duty by not acting 
when there is a duty to act; this is referred to as nonfeasance. Second, educators can 
breach their duty by failing to act properly when there is a duty to act; this is known as 
misfeasance. In addition, where educators act improperly or with evil intent, they commit 
malfeasance, more properly an intentional tort that is mentioned here because it sounds 
much like the names of the negligence torts, as in cases involving sexual misconduct with 
students. Further, if school officials are aware that employees are failing to meet their 
responsibilities, whether due to nonfeasance, misfeasance, or, for that matter, malfea-
sance, then they, and their boards, may be liable for the tortious conduct of staff members. 
The second major consideration under breach is the standard of care that educators 
must follow. In evaluating whether individuals have met the requisite level of care, courts 
have adopted a common law standard of reasonableness. Courts typically instruct juries 
to consider the behavior of school personnel in light of the legal fiction known as the 
reasonable person, also known as the reasonably prudent person. While stopping short of 
establishing a clear hierarchy, based on education and years of experience working with 
children, a reasonable teacher is likely to be expected to provide a higher standard of care 
than a reasonable person but not to the same level as a reasonable parent. In other words, 
courts have tried to create an objective standard that requires teachers to provide the 
same level of care as reasonably prudent professionals based on equivalent age, training, 
education, experience, maturity, and other relevant characteristics. 
A sports case illustrates the significance of applying the proper standard in negligence 
cases. When a high school football player who was being considered for an athletic schol-
arship to college broke his neck while correctly executing a block, the New York's highest 
court declared that the coach should not have been judged under the same standard of 
care as a reasonably prudent parent and that he satisfied the less-demanding standard of 
ordinary reasonable care associated with educators.23 Moreover, the court declared that 
insofar as the student voluntarily participated in the game, the coach could rely on the 
assumption of risk defense to avoid liability. 24 
In another football game involving an injury, a high school player sued his school 
board and others after his coaches, both of whom had teaching certificates and coaching 
endorsements, allowed him to return to a game in which he had suffered a head injury. 
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The supreme court of Nebraska held that the proper standard of care for the coaches was 
that of a reasonably prudent person with a teaching certificate and coaching endorsement 
r~ther than the lower standard of the reasonable person who did not possess such creden-
tJ.al~.25 The Court explained that since coaches with coaching endorsements received spe-
cla.hzed training in athletic injuries, including head injuries, they should have met the 
heIghtened standard of care. The court remanded for a determination of whether they 
ac.ted in accord with this higher standard, but there are no further reports of litigation in 
thIS controversy. 
Injury 
For aggrieved parties to prevail, injuries must be those for which compensation can be 
awarded. For instance, if a student who was running through a school hallway slipped 
and fell on water that leaked from a drinking fountain and that had been accumulating on 
the floor for some time, three factors would come into play. The first question is whether sC~O~1 officials had a duty to keep the floor safe and clean. Assuming the obvious, that 
offICIals had such a duty, the related question of foreseeability comes into play. To the 
extent that officials should have foreseen that such an incident could have occurred, they sh~~ld have had it cleaned up reasonably quickly. Second, the issue of the duty by school Of~IClals and possible breach, in terms of supervising the area, must be reviewed. The 
thIrd concern focuses on the nature of the child's injuries. If the student's only injury was 
a ,:"et pair of pants, then it is highly unlikely that his claim will proceed. However, if the ~h.lld broke his leg on falling, then there is a greater likelihood that this may be deemed an 
IllJury for which compensation can be awarded . 
. To the extent that the existence of a physical harm is present in most of the cases ~Iscussed in this section, one additional, unusual case from Louisiana exemplifies causa-
hon b?, illustrating the nature of an injury. An appellate court affirmed that a school board 
was !Iable for the emotional injuries that a kindergarten-aged child suffered when a 
phYSIcal education teacher told him that he hanged his friends with a jump rope. 26 The 
court agreed that in light of evidence that revealed that the child was a well-adjusted five-
yea.r-old before the teacher pretended to have hanged his friends, he and his parents were 
entItled to remuneration for his injuries. 
Causation 
The final element in establishing liability for negligence is that school personnel must 
be the legal, or proximate calise, of the injuries brought about by their breaches. This 
means that as situations evolve, the last person or persons in a temporal chain of events 
who could have acted to prevent injuries from occurring are typically considered as at 
least contributing to the legal cause. 
Two cases from New York illustrate judicial reasoning in this regard. As two middle 
school stu~ents engaged in physical play during recess, shortly after they stopped doing 
so, one c~lld threw a stick and injured the eye of the other. When parents filed a negli-
gence claIm, an appellate court ruled that since there was insufficient actual or construc-
tive notice of dangerous conduct that such an injury would have occurred, educators did 
not breach their duty of adequate supervision. 27 The court added that any negligence on 
the part of ed~cators did not proximately cause the student's injury because the time span 
between the ftght and the stick-throwing incident was so short that greater supervision coul~ not hav~ prevented the injury. The court also noted that the student's supervisory 
negligence c1am1 was without merit since he was a willing participant in the incident. 
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At issue in New York was whether a board was at fault in a case filed by a high school 
student who was assaulted in school after school hours by a former student. An appellate 
court in New York maintained that the board was not liable absent evidence that the 
attack was foreseeable.28 The court posited not only that, although there were previous 
trespassing incidents by former students after school hours, none involved physical vio-
lence against students but also that any negligence by the school officials was not the 
proximate cause of the students' injuries. 
Off of School Grounds 
The duty to supervise students on school grounds is clear. Amid efforts to extend the 
scope of duty beyond school grounds, it is important to emphasize that the common law 
sets the duty of school officials as coextensive with their physical custody and control 
over children. 
When boards provide transportation for children, they extend their boundaries via the 
bus to the bus stops where students board and leave their buses. 29 As can be expected, the 
use of school buses to transport students has generated a fair amount of litigation. As 
noted in chapter 5, on transportation, as long as bus stops are not located in unreasonably 
dangerous places, boards are unlikely to be liable for injuries to children that OCCur 
there. 3o Further, boards have no duty to ensure that students reach designated bus stops 
safely prior to the arrival of school buses,31 and, as long as the distance from their homes 
is reasonable, children can be required to walk to bus stops. 
On homeward trips, the duty of bus drivers is to see that children have crossed roads 
to the opposite sides of streets if necessary.32 In such a case, an appellate court in Georgia 
rejected aboard's motion for summary judgment in the wrongful death action a mother 
brought against it, the school bus driver, and another driver after the other driver struck 
and killed her daughter. 33 After the mother and other driver reached a settlement agree-
ment, the court affirmed that material issues of fact existed as to whether the bus driver 
initiated the boarding procedure for children. In a case from New York, parents of a 
student who was injured when struck by a car as he exited a bus sued the bus company, 
driver, and school board. An appellate court affirmed that the bus company's failure to 
equip the vehicle as a school bus did not violate a law regulating school buses since it was 
inapplicable to a bus that was not used solely to transport students. 34 
Where a second-grade student who was dropped off early by his school bus driver 
died as a result of injuries that he sustained while attempting to climb into his house 
through a window, his parents sued the board for negligence. The supreme court of Ohio 
held that, while the board waived its right to statutory immunity, a genuine issue of 
material fact existed as to whether the driver violated the statute prohibiting school bus 
drivers from starting their vehicles until after the children leaving them have reached 
places of safety. 35 
In a case that also concerns field trips, the parents of first graders and chaperones who 
were injured when a school bus driver lost control of his vehicle sought further review of 
a jury verdict in favor of the board and driver. Reversing in favor of the plaintiffs, an 
appellate panel in Indiana was of the opinion that the trial court committed a reversible 
error in not instructing the jury that it reasonably could have inferred that the driver 
should not have lost control of her bus as much as she did on a clear, dry spring day. 36 
School-sponsored field trips require special supervisory precautions because children 
are taken to unfamiliar places. While there are no specific rules, the younger the students 
are, the greater the amount and degree of supervision that educators must provide. When 
a sixth grader was raped by acquaintances after she left the park where a class field trip 
was taking place, the supervising teacher had left the park without her, stopped by her 
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house, and returned to school. Although the teacher contacted the child's mother, she did 
not disclose the incident to officials at the school. New York's highest court decided that 
the board was liable since evidence supported the jury's verdict that the rape was a 
foreseeable result of the danger created by the failur of educators to adequately super-
vise the outing.37 
On a field trip to a zoo, a parent whose son was assaulted by children from another 
school s~ed ~heir board for negligent supervision. The federal trial court in the District of 
Columbia rejected the board's motion to dismiss the claim on the basis that its staff owed 
a duty to supervise its students in order to prevent foreseeable harm such as the type that 
befell the child.38 
. Difficulties can often arise when students are permitted, as part of open campus poli-
cI.es, t? leave school. In LouiSiana, after a junior high school student checked herself out in 
vI~latlOn of a school policy that authorized only the principal or vice principal to allow a 
Child. to leave during regular class hours, she was sexually molested by a stranger while 
walk1l1~ I~ome through a bad neighborhood. An appellate court affirmed that the board 
and offiCials breached their duty since the scope of their supervisory responsibilities 
encompassed the foreseeable risk that a female walking through a bad neighborhood 
might fall victim to a criminal in the area.39 
On the other hand, another appellate court in Louisiana reviewed whether a board 
owed a duty to ensure the safety of a child who ordinarily walked home alone from 
school after an extracurricular activity. The board stationed crossing guards at the high-
way where the student was injured at the end of the school day but not at the completion 
of after-school activities. The court affirmed that insofar as the one-hour time period that 
the guard was on duty was appropriate, it would have been unreasonable to impose a 
duty on school officials to require them to have students walk home in groups. 40 
As a final concern involving out-of-school activities, it is understandable that educa-
tors seek to limit liability for student participation in activities, such as sports, ~h~t can 
cause injuries. As long as officials carefully craft release forms, courts are unwl1l1l1g to 
impose liability.41 Yet, courts are likely to invalidate releases that are too broad o~ ~agu.e. 
In such a case, the Supreme court of Washington vitiated release forms that offlc.la!s. 111 
different districts required students to sign before engaging in school-related a.ctlvltles, 
such as interscholastic athletics. The court held the releases, which were deSigned to 
protect the boards from all future negligence, violated public policy. 42 Similarly, a~l appel-
late court in New York invalidated a release form executed by parents of a child who 
participated in youth wrestling activity that stated that they absolved only the president 
of the tournament and head coach of all risks beyond those inherent in wrestling. 43 '~he 
court affirmed that the release was void ab initio and did not bar their negligence action 
because it failed to limit liability plainly and precisely. 
Defenses 
Even if injured parties established that the elements of negligence are present, school 
boards and their employees have three primary defenses available to limit or eliminate 
liability. The defenses recognize that even though boards and officials have the duty to 
look after students, they cannot be accountable for all possible harms that occur during 
school hours. 
Immunity 
Immunity is the most frequently used defense by school systems. Immunity is based 
on the common law principle, now supplemented by state statutes dealing with such 
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aspects as recreational 44 and discretionary function 45 immunity laws that the govern-
ment, in and through its various branches and departments such as school boards, cannot 
be liable for the tortious acts of their officers or employees. 
Contributory/Comparative Negligence 
Both contributory and comparative negligence are premised on parties' having played 
a part in causing their injuries. Yet, the difference between these similar-sounding de-
fenses, which now apply in an almost equal number of jurisdictions, can be profoun~. 
Contributory negligence completely bars individuals from recovering for their injuries If 
they contributed in any way to the harm that they suffered. 46 
As courts and legislatures realized that the contributory negligence defense often led 
to inequitable results, an increasing number of jurisdictions turned to the defense of 
comparative negligence. Comparative negligence permits juries to apportion liability 
based on percentages of relative fault between the parties, as most states that rely on thIS 
defense allow plaintiffs to recover for the harm that they suffered if they are not more 
than 50 percent liable. 47 Some states may apply pure comparative negligence, which 
permits plaintiffs to recover even if they contributed to more than 50 percent to their 
injuries. 48 
In a related concern involving liability, issues arise as to the appropriate standard to 
apply when children contribute to their injuries. Rather than expecting children to meet 
the same standard of adults, courts take their age and physical condition into account 
when the defense of comparative negligence is raised. As a general rule, courts agree that 
children under the age of seven are incapable of negligence for their own behavior while 
those over the age of fourteen may be accountable on a case-by-case basis. In such a case, 
an appellate court in Louisiana ruled that a six-year-old child did not negligently cause 
his own injury even though he ran out into the street into the side of a car while returning 
to school to wait for his mother. 49 The court observed that the six-year-old did not share 
in the fault for his injury because he acted in the manner that could have been expected of 
a child of his age. 
Assumption of Risk 
Assumption of risk, which is also based on comparative fault, can reduce the recovery 
of injured parties in proportion to the degree to which their culpable conduct contributed 
to accidents if they voluntarily exposed themselves to known and appreciated risks of 
harm. As noted, this defense frequently applies involving students and sports. 
In New York, for example, an appellate court affirmed that a cheerleader who was 
injured during practice could not recover from her school board since she assumed the 
risks of her sport and was practicing voluntarily under the supervision of her coach. 50 
Earlier, another appellate court in New York ruled that where a ninth-grade student 
voluntarily participated in a basketball game in a school yard where a hole on the playing 
surface was clearly visible, he knowingly assumed the risk of injury such that the board 
was not liable for the injuries he sustained when he fell .51 Other courts reached similar 
results in agreeing that assumption of risk prevented suits from continuing where plain-
tiffs were injured while participating in interscholastic baseball, 52 basketball, 53 cheerlead-
ing,54 equestrian activities, 55 field hockey, 56 football,57 gymnastics, 58 ice hockey,59 la-
crosse,60 soccer, 61 softball,62 swimming,63 track and field,64 tennis, 65 wrestling,66 and 
weight lifting. 67 
Courts have been unwilling to apply the assumption of risk defense in such school 
settings as where coaches had students warm up for games in hazardous locations prior 
to the start of a volleyball game, 68 for conducting a track practice in a high school hallway 
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that unreasonably increased a student's risk of injury, 69 and in interscholastic sports such 
as footbalJ70 and softballJl When dealing with physical education classes, as opposed to 
e.xtracurricular athletic events, courts rejected board attempts to rely on the assumption of 
fisk defense when educators failed to provide appropriate safety equipment for such 
activities as in-line skating72 and softball. 73 
CONCLUSION 
Compliance with the rules of negligence and adequate supervision do not guarantee 
SBOs, their boards, and other educational leaders that they will have perfectly safe 
schools or that they will enjoy complete immunity from litigation. However, the more 
carefUlly that SBOs their boards and other educational leaders impress the need to f II ' , 
o ?w these directions on board employees, they are to have safe schools that are not 
subject to costly, yet avoidable, litigation. 
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